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BEARD & HOLMES ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
ADJUDICATION 
Adrian Vermeule* 
My title is somewhat misleading, because Beard said little 
about constitutional adjudication,1 while Holmes thought little of 
Beard’s most famous book. But I hope it will prove illuminating 
to wire a connection between these two thinkers. A century ago, 
Beard set us a puzzle to which Holmes gave us an answer. Not 
necessarily the only answer, and perhaps not even the right 
answer. But at least it is coherent, and that is not to be sneered at 
in constitutional theory. Let me explain. 
Charles Beard’s 1913 book, An Economic Interpretation of 
the Constitution, structured a whole field of historical inquiry into 
the founding, for a generation at least. Does Beardian scholarship 
have any utility for public law adjudication, and if so, what sort of 
utility does it have? By “Beardian scholarship” I do not mean just 
Beard’s own book of 1913, which has less and less to offer judges 
today, as the founding era recedes. (The same point applies to 
more recent public choice scholarship on the Framing era, such as 
Robert McGuire’s book on the political determinants of the 
framers’ behavior.2) Rather, I mean scholarship in a broader 
tradition or style that Beard initiated—scholarship from an 
external perspective that attempts to understand and describe the 
actual motives of constitutional rulemakers, as opposed to their 
idealized motives, or the public-regarding rhetoric that may 
accompany their actions and choices. That definition 
 *  John H. Watson Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Presented at the 
conference on CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913), University of Virginia Law School, 
October 24-25, 2013. For helpful comments, thanks to Hank Chambers and the other 
conference participants, and to Heidi Kitrosser, Sai Prakash, Fred Schauer and Cass 
Sunstein. Thanks to Rachel Siegel for excellent research assistance. 
 1. Beyond defending constitutional judicial review itself as consistent with the 
original understanding. See CHARLES A. BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (1912). 
 2. ROBERT A. MCGUIRE, TO FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION: A NEW ECONOMIC 
INTERPRETATION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2003). 
457 
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encompasses any work in political economy or positive political 
theory that attempts to explain the genesis of constitutional rules, 
unwritten constitutional conventions, and major quasi-
constitutional statutes. Examples in the last category include 
studies on the political origins of the Administrative Procedure 
Act3 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 
This is really just an example of a larger methodological 
problem: what is the connection, if any, between the external 
perspective of the historian or political scientist and the internal 
perspective of lawyers and judges?5 That is Beard’s puzzle; Beard 
challenges us either to reconcile our external and internal 
perspectives on constitutionalism, or else conceivably to declare 
them irreconcilable. 
I will begin by showing that standard approaches to 
constitutional adjudication—originalism6 and Dworkinian 
moralism7—are resolutely internal and thus have little use for the 
external standpoint of Beardian scholarship. I will then describe a 
strategy of reconciliation offered by Justice Holmes, one that 
connects external and internal perspectives by means of a 
nonideal theory of constitutional judging. There is some irony 
here, for Holmes himself was critical of Beard in correspondence. 
Yet Holmes was more Beardian than he knew; once we 
understand Holmes’s implicit theory of judging, it naturally 
creates a role for Beardian scholarship. 
In my view, Holmes offers a nonideal theory of judging under 
political constraints; the theory holds that the rational judge 
chooses the course of action that, at lowest possible cost, adjusts 
constitutional law and policy to match “the actual equilibrium of 
force in the community—that is, conformity to the wishes of the 
 3. Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Positive and Normative Models of Procedural 
Rights: An Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures, 6 J.L. ECON & ORG. 307 
(1990). 
 4. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of 
Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417 (2002-2003). 
 5. For earlier efforts on this nagging topic, see Adrian Vermeule, Self-Defeating 
Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 631 (2006); Adrian 
Vermeule, Connecting Positive and Normative Legal Theory, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 387 
(2007-2008); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1743 (2014). For another connection between Beard and Holmes, see Keith 
Sharfman, The First Economic Analyst of Law?, 6 GREEN BAG 2d. 99, 106 & n.28 (2002). 
 6. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1988-1989). 
 7. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).  
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dominant power[].”8 In this framework, Beardian scholarship 
offers external analysis of the shape and force of the political 
constraints that the Holmesian judge should take into account 
when making constitutional law. External Beardian scholarship, 
in other words, helps to delineate the feasible political options or 
possibilities for constitutional law9, a critical datum from the 
internal but nonideal perspective of the Holmesian judge. 
(Beardian scholarship is not the only source of insight into 
constitutional possibilities, of course; the Holmesian judge faces 
the question whether to consult materials like public opinion 
polls, a question I touch upon later.) 
It is a separate question, of course, whether Holmes’s theory 
is a good one. I do not at all mean to address that question, or to 
defend Holmes’s theory on its merits. I aim to show only that 
there exists a prominent strand of American theory about 
judging—and by definition any theory held by Holmes is 
prominent—that is coherent and that allows us to internalize 
Beardian scholarship within the legal enterprise, should we want 
to do so. 
I. STANDARD THEORIES 
Let me begin by examining standard theories of 
constitutional adjudication, originalism and Dworkinism, to see 
whether they can make any use of Beardian scholarship.10 I do not 
see how they can. Both originalist and Dworkinian judges show 
little interest in Beard,11 and given their theories that lack of 
interest makes perfect sense. Although the reasons differ 
somewhat in the two cases, the common theme is that neither the 
 8. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Montesquieu, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS  250, 
258 (1920). 
 9. Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Possibilities, 83 IND. L.J. 307 (2008). 
 10. The recent fashion is for Dworkinians to call themselves originalists, see, e.g., 
JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011), but nothing of substance in my discussion 
changes if we move the labels around in this way. 
 11. In this setting, we should put very little stock in citation analysis of Supreme 
Court opinions; citation of any secondary non-legal materials by the Court was rare before 
about 1980. See Frederick Schauer & Virginia Wise, Nonlegal Information and the 
Delegalization of Law, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 495 (2000). Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 
290 U.S. 398, 421 n.3 (1934); see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969). For the little it is worth, however, I report that 
(1) Beard’s book has been cited for the truth of its main thesis exactly once in an opinion 
by a Justice of the Supreme Court, and even that was in a dissent—Justice Sutherland’s 
dissent for the Four Horsemen in Blaisdell (with friends like this, who needs enemies?); 
(2) by contrast, Wood’s THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 has 
been cited twelve times by the Court, despite having been published nearly sixty years after 
Beard’s book.  
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originalist nor the Dworkinian approach has any use for external 
debunking of the framers’ motivations. 
It is striking that originalists, who focus obsessively on the 
founding era, show so little interest in Beard. I believe there are 
several factors at work here. For one thing, originalism is a family 
of theories, and some members of the family are engaged in an 
enterprise to which Beard simply does not speak. To the extent 
that originalists emphasize the original public and semantic 
meaning of terms, Beard’s work will be of little value to them. 
Originalists of that sort naturally look to the ratification debates, 
not to the confidential proceedings of the Philadelphia 
convention. Beard focuses precisely on those proceedings, and on 
the motivations of the framers who participated in them. By 
contrast, Beard’s interest in the ratification debates is secondary, 
and not focused on original public meaning anyway. So Beard’s 
potential relevance is largely restricted to older versions of 
originalism12 that look to the intentions of the framers at 
Philadelphia. But those versions have few adherents nowadays. 
There is a deeper issue, however. Originalists of any stripe do 
not want to invoke an account of the founding era that casts an 
unflattering light on the motives of the political actors whose 
decisions are supposed, by the originalist theory, to be 
authoritative for later generations. This is a problem in the 
political theory of constitutionalism as much as a problem within 
constitutional theory in a narrower sense. The less normatively 
attractive the purposes and commitments of the framers, the 
harder it is to argue that their decisions should be seen as 
authoritative. The point is not a logical or jurisprudential one; I 
think we can imagine, although barely, a polity in which a 
constitution written by utterly self-interested actors is treated as 
binding law and interpreted along originalist lines. But from the 
standpoint of political psychology, a regime like that simply will 
not fly. It is not psychologically possible to generate large-scale 
working commitment—constitutional faith13—in the service of a 
regime whose genesis is normatively disreputable, and known by 
all to be so. 
Dworkinians also want an account of the Constitution that 
puts it in the best possible light, emphasizing justification in terms 
of political morality as well as fit with the legal materials; hence, 
Beard’s debunking emphasis on the self-interested motives of the 
 12. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977). 
 13. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (2011).  
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framers and their constituents is difficult to incorporate into a 
Dworkinian framework. Fit and justification work at cross-
purposes when the judge has to fit doctrine to a constitutional 
framework written to protect the class interests of property-
holding merchant elites of the eastern seaboard, striking a corrupt 
bargain with southern slaveowners. Dworkinians, of course, are 
not limited to originalist sources or datapoints; when engaged in 
justification, the Dworkinian judge may draw “principles” from 
the entirety of political history, and this is both the main strength 
and main weakness of Dworkinism. But the constraint of fit 
means that the Dworkinian judge is supposed to connect current 
principles with the founding era in some sort of coherent chain-
novel account.14 If the first chapter is hopelessly disreputable from 
a normative point of view, the chain-novel lacks integrity and 
never gets underway. 
True, Dworkinian judges tend to emphasize the 
Reconstruction Amendments, with their guarantees of equality in 
various forms, and downplay the Constitution of 1787 to some 
degree. The Reconstruction Amendments are plausibly a more 
idealistic set of texts—although a standard debunking account 
explains their genesis in terms of the partisan interests of 
congressional Republicans. But in any event, the Reconstruction 
Amendments do not a Constitution make, not by themselves. 
They presuppose the basic structure of government set out in the 
document of 1787, and if the genesis of that structure is hopelessly 
disreputable, the Reconstruction Amendments fall too. 
There are several ways to massage the problem, but none is 
fully satisfactory. One may observe that—according both to 
Beard and to the follow-on scholarship, like McGuire—many of 
the framers, much of the time, weren’t so much self-interested as 
faithful representatives of self-interested constituents, whose 
economic interests the framer-representatives understood 
particularly clearly.15 While that might or might not absolve the 
framers of personal opprobrium, depending upon what theory of 
representation one holds, it doesn’t make the genesis of the 
Constitution any more normatively appealing. The framers’ 
 14. DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 228–38. 
 15. JON ELSTER, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE: JURIES, ASSEMBLIES, ELECTIONS 
(2013). In fact, Beard’s text is systematically ambiguous as between this interpretation, and 
the cruder interpretation of direct self-interest on the framers’ own part. See Forrest 
McDonald, Introduction to CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF 
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (The Free Press modern reprt. 1986) (1913). The famous 
protracted analysis of the framers’ personal holdings of securities, BEARD, supra note 1 at 
74–101, is relevant only if the claim is direct self-interest.  
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faithful agency on behalf of self-interested constituents would just 
add one more step in the chain of transmission between the 
normatively disreputable motives and the constitutional outcome. 
For the same reasons, there is little comfort in the 
observation, true though it seems to be, that the main force 
operating on the framers was not self-interested motivation per 
se, but motivated reasoning,16 or self-serving beliefs about where 
the public interest lay17—what Bentham would later call interest-
begotten prejudice.18 If our concern is to allocate moral praise or 
blame to individuals, then we might care to know whether a 
representative purporting to serve the public interest is behaving 
selfishly because of a corrupt heart, or instead because of a biased 
head; perhaps the latter is less blameworthy, although even that is 
hardly clear. But if our concern is to understand whether the 
constitution under which we live and that the judges have to 
interpret has a normatively disreputable genesis, then it is hard to 
see why the distinction should matter at all. 
Another approach—the most promising of the possible 
salvage operations—is to distinguish the framers’ motives from 
their justifications. However disreputable the motivations for the 
constitutional rules they wrote, their rhetoric was public-
regarding, and the judge may take them at face value, holding 
them to their professed ideals (“the civilizing force of 
hypocrisy,”19 enforced by judicial decree). To some degree, this is 
what originalists and Dworkinians actually do; when they quote 
the framers, it is invariably for some public-regarding justification 
of constitutional rules. Dynamically, constitutional law may be 
understood to work itself pure over time, through a kind of 
common-law process in which constitutional ideals and principles 
are progressively clarified and separated from the dross of the 
Constitution’s self-interested origins. 
Yet there are lingering problems here as well. One of the 
reasons that Beard’s book retains the power to shock, even today, 
is that he so effectively compiles public statements by the framers 
that aren’t particularly public-regarding at all, even at the level of 
 16. See Milton Lodge & Charles Taber, Three Steps Toward a Theory of Motivated 
Political Reasoning, in ELEMENTS OF REASON, COGNITION, CHOICE AND BOUNDS OF 
RATIONALITY 183 (2000). 
 17. BEARD, supra note 1. 
 18. JEREMY BENTHAM, BENTHAM’S HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL FALLACIES, 54–56 
(Harold A. Larrabee ed., 1954) (1824). 
 19. Jon Elster, Introduction, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 12 (Jon Elster, ed., 
1998).  
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ideals. Rather they reek of class interest or of the unselfconscious, 
but revealing, blinkered prejudices of a comfortable elite. 
Furthermore, public-regarding values change over time; 
Dworkinians in particular do not want to enforce professions of 
loyalty to values that are radically out of step with current political 
morality. And, finally, even if the framers say something that does 
count as public-regarding, and even if it still comports with 
current political morality, there is the problem of rationalization. 
Why exactly is it a good idea to seriously consider and enforce 
even public-regarding justifications for a rule R, when if the rule 
had been –R, there would inevitably have been a different, 
opposite, equally public-regarding justification for that? Of 
course the relevant justification might still be true, but the issue is 
whether the endorsement by a self-interested framer gives it any 
additional epistemic warrant or credence. The answer is no; we 
ought not have any greater confidence in the justification if we 
think that the self-interested framer would have come up with 
some plausible justification for whatever rule happened to 
promote his interests. 
These are not normative claims. They are conditional claims 
about the relevance of Beardian scholarship—conditional, that is, 
on accepting either originalist or Dworkinian premises. Neither 
approach can connect external Beardian scholarship with the 
internal project of constitutional adjudication. There is just no 
use, on the standard theories, for work that engages in systematic 
debunking of the framers’ political motivations from an external 
point of view. 
The consequence of all this is a radical disconnect between 
the discipline of constitutional history, on the one hand, and 
constitutional law on the other. Beard’s work structured the 
whole field of constitutional history—whether through agreement 
or criticism—for two generations, and initiated a broader style of 
pitiless political explanation of the causal origins of constitutional 
arrangements. But constitutional law has been largely impervious 
to these sorts of external explanations. 
Now this disconnect might not bother or puzzle us. We might 
be happy to have separate spheres of constitutional discourse, one 
external and one internal. In my view, however, knowledge about 
the disreputable causal origins of the constitutional rules creates 
a kind of shadow of illegitimacy that hangs over the internal legal 
enterprise. For those who think that causal origins are irrelevant 
to the internal legal enterprise, what if we discovered heretofore 
super-secret notes of the Philadelphia convention proving,  
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indisputably, that as an elaborate joke the framers had rolled dice 
in a back room to determine what rules they would vote to adopt, 
and then (laughing up their sleeves all the while) staged 
apparently serious debates, complete with public-regarding 
justifications for those rules—could the internal enterprise of 
constitutional argument go on as before? 
If we do find the disconnect between external and internal 
perspectives puzzling; if we would like some sort of coherence 
between our best positive accounts of constitutional lawmaking, 
and our normative accounts of constitutional lawmaking; if we 
want some sort of relationship between a major stream of 
constitutional research in history and political science, on the one 
hand, and constitutional adjudication on the other; then we need 
to consider the Holmesian approach to constitutional 
adjudication, to which I will now turn. 
II. HOLMESIAN ADJUDICATION 
Why, if at all, should judges deciding public-law cases care 
that the framers and their constituents acted, in important 
respects, on self-interested economic motives? Of course 
Beardian scholarship might have all sorts of utility other than for 
judges—either intellectual utility for analysts of the constitutional 
system, or pragmatic utility for nonjudicial actors within the 
constitutional system. But my topic here will be its possible value 
for judging in public law, including constitutional law, 
administrative law, and statutory interpretation. 
I will suggest that Beardian scholarship may be connected up 
with the internal standpoint of legal actors through a Holmesian 
account of constitutional adjudication. The critical connection is 
that Holmes offers a nonideal theory of judging under political 
constraints, and Beardian scholarship serves the function of 
helping the judge to identify the political constraints correctly. 
Beardian scholarship, in other words, offers an expert assessment 
on a background question of legislative fact—namely, the shape 
and force of the political constraints that a nonideal theory of 
adjudication takes into account. Holmes believes that in judging, 
anyway, “ought implies can”; that “can” is shaped by politics as 
well as legal, technical and economic factors; and that the best 
course of action for judges to follow involves efficient compliance 
with political constraints, at least in the short run. 
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A. THE LEAST-COST PRINCIPLE 
Let me begin with a sketch of Holmes’s view, which 
continues to be misunderstood despite all the ink that has been 
spilled. Holmes’s thinking about law and politics was influenced 
by an unlikely pair of arguments, which really boil down to the 
same argument. One was a brilliant mini-essay by Montesquieu in 
the Persian Letters, in which Montesquieu puts into the mouth of 
one of his characters an apercu about government that struck 
Holmes as profound: “the most perfect [government] is that which 
attains its goal with the least friction; thus that government is most 
perfect which leads men along paths most agreeable to their 
interests and inclinations.”20 In an essay on Montesquieu, Holmes 
characteristically paraphrased this idea in a more economic and 
subtly darker tone: 
[T]he most perfect government is that which attains its ends 
with the least cost, so that the one which leads men in the way 
most according to their inclination is best. . . . What proximate 
test of excellence can be found except correspondence to the 
actual equilibrium of force in the community – that is, 
conformity to the wishes of the dominant power? Of course, 
such conformity may lead to destruction, and it is desirable that 
the dominant power should be wise. But wise or not, the 
proximate test of a good government is that the dominant 
power has its way.21 
The second argument was offered by the greatest mind law 
students have never heard of, James Fitzjames Stephen, the 
English barrister, judge and intellectual who is known today, if at 
all, largely for his withering critique of Mill.22 Stephen has many 
other major contributions and one is an important normative but 
nonideal account of politics, formulated in the mid-19th century 
when British intellectual elites had to grapple with the increasing 
democratization of British politics, and the increasing dominance 
of mass popular majorities. As to the dominance of the masses, 
Stephen observed that 
there is no use in discussing the question whether this is a good 
state of things or a bad one. For all practical purposes it is 
enough to say that it exists, and that it is the part of rational 
 20. Letter from Usbek to Rhedi, in PERSIAN LETTERS (C.J. Betts, trans., Penguin ed. 
1973) (1721). 
 21. HOLMES, supra note 8, at 257–58. 
 22. SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY, 1829-1894 
(1873).  
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men to make the best of it, as they make the best of the climate, 
the soil, or the national character of their country.23 
Rational political statesmanship, on the part of elites, takes the 
dominance of the masses as a political constraint and then looks 
for the best feasible course of action, given that constraint. 
The unholy offspring of Montesquieu and Stephen is a 
principle that informs all of Holmes’s work. We might call it the 
least-cost principle: political statesmanship consists in choosing 
the course of action that, at lowest possible cost, adjusts policy to 
match the “actual equilibrium of force in the community – that is, 
conformity to the wishes of the dominant power[].”24 The 
adjustment should take place with a minimum of friction. There 
may be a minor role for statesmanship in slowing down the 
process of adjustment; Holmes once wrote in a casenote in the 
Harvard Law Review that 
[a]ll that can be expected from modern improvements is that 
legislation should easily and quickly, yet not too quickly, 
modify itself in accordance with the will of the de facto 
supreme power in the community, and that the spread of an 
educated sympathy should reduce the sacrifice of minorities to 
a minimum.25 
Another margin of discretion for elites arises because the 
dominant power—dominant public opinion, in a democratic 
polity—will have no well-formed views on many issues that lack 
political salience, or that are technically complex. There may also 
be issues as to which the views of the dominant power are partially 
endogenous, susceptible to shaping by elites or statesmen; I return 
to this point later. But the overall idea, as to salient public 
questions on which dominant public opinion has a clear and firm 
view, is that the role of the statesman is to discern the actual 
equilibrium of force in the community, to adjust or update 
obsolete rules to conform to the wishes of the dominant power, 
and to execute the function that Marx attributed to the 
vanguard—to “shorten and lessen the birth-pangs”26 of transition 
to an impending state of economic and political relationships, and 
their inevitable embodiment in law. 
 23. SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, Parliamentary Government I, 23 THE 
CONTEMP. REV. 1, 2 (1874). 
 24. HOLMES, supra note 8. 
 25. Anonymous [Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.], The Gas-Stokers’ Strike, 7 AM. L. 
REV. 582–83 (1873). 
 26. Karl MARX, Preface to CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 15 
(Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., 1906).  
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The cold logic of the least-cost principle does not rest on a 
directly normative or ideal account of political morality. Instead 
it rests on an indirectly normative or nonideal account of political 
morality. The cold logic is that the dominant political forces will 
have their way in any event, sooner or later. The only feasible 
choices are to give them what they want after a costly struggle, 
creating deadweight social losses, or to give them what they want 
sooner rather than later, at lower cost and with less friction. 
An illustration is the Reform Bill of 1867, by which Disraeli 
expanded the franchise after massive demonstrations. Stephen 
thought this was enlightened statesmanship, despite his pessimism 
about the policies that a mass democratic society would produce. 
It was enlightened because the alternative was an even costlier 
bout of civic turmoil, which would have eventually produced the 
same broader distribution of political power anyway, just at 
higher cost: 
[The Reform Bill of 1867] was passed because it was felt 
universally that some such measure was necessary in order to 
adjust the form of our Government to the great changes which 
had taken place in the body of the nation. In short, a step was 
taken with a good grace which it would have been absolutely 
necessary to take somehow or other, sooner or later.27 
Holmes picked up this least-cost principle and transposed it 
into an account of adjudication on the American scene. In 
criminal law, Stephen had famously written that “[t]he criminal 
law stands to the passion of revenge in much the same relation as 
marriage to the sexual appetite.”28 The state supplies regulated 
retribution and regulated reproduction because the unregulated 
versions of those activities will inevitably occur in any event, just 
in an unruly and more costly manner. Holmes made the political 
logic explicit, writing in The Common Law that 
[t]he first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should 
correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the 
community, whether right or wrong. If people would gratify 
the passion of revenge outside of the law, if the law would not 
help them, the law has no choice but to satisfy the craving itself, 
and thus avoid the greater evil of private retribution.29 
 27. STEPHEN, supra note 22, at 4. 
 28. JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
ENGLAND 99 (1863). 
 29. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 41–42 (1881).  
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Likewise for constitutional adjudication. The function of 
constitutional adjudication is to ensure that “legislation should 
easily and quickly, yet not too quickly, modify itself in accordance 
with the will of the de facto supreme power in the community.”30 
Such an approach ensures that constitutional law will yield 
incentive-compatible constitutional rules and will thus embody a 
stable political equilibrium—until either the views of the 
dominant power change, or until the dominant power itself 
changes. Any other approach will produce pointless political 
friction, without changing the ultimate outcomes. 
The least-cost approach underlies Holmes’s most famous 
pronouncements about constitutional law. The point of the 
Lochner dissent was not to support progressive economic 
regulation, but to counsel other judges against a costly attempt—
which would inevitably be futile in the long run—to deploy 
constitutional law so as to “prevent the natural outcome of a 
dominant opinion.”31 Although Progressives and New Dealers 
wanted to claim Holmes as a forerunner, he believed and said 
quite clearly that he thought Progressive economic and social 
policy was based on a sort of fiscal illusion.32 But he thought—like 
Stephen—that the masses swayed by the illusion were firmly in 
the saddle, and that the only rational course of action for judges 
was to get out of the way. 
So too for free speech. Holmes’s dissent in Gitlow v. New 
York,33 in my view, is far more characteristic of his overall 
approach than is his more famous dissent in Abrams v. United 
States (with its praise for “free trade in ideas”).34 In Gitlow the 
majority upheld a conviction for distributing a socialist manifesto. 
Holmes’s dissent argued, in effect, that the majority here was 
behaving just like the majority in Lochner, by attempting to use 
law to suppress what might turn out to be the politically dominant 
forces of the future. As Holmes put it, “[i]f in the long run the 
beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be 
accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only 
meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance 
and have their way.”35 
 30. HOLMES, supra note 24, at 583. 
 31. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 32. HOLMES, supra note 8, Economic Elements at 279. 
 33. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
 34. Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 35. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
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This is slightly counterintuitive, because the natural—
although erroneous—assumption is that the Holmesian approach 
would always counsel upholding government action, implying a 
dissent in Lochner but a vote with the majority in Gitlow. But 
because of the agency slack that may exist even in a democratic 
society, any given policy of the existing government may be out of 
step with the wishes of the dominant political power, and it is even 
more likely that the existing government will be out of step with 
a rising political power, such as the left-wing agitators in Gitlow. 
In my view Holmes’s famous flip-flop on free speech, around the 
end of World War I, was at least partly due to a simple realization 
that the least-cost principle might sometimes underwrite 
constitutional protection, constitutional invalidation of current 
policies, where political speech was at issue. If socialism is 
“destined” to arrive, then allowing governmental repression of its 
advocates is an exercise in futility that raises costs all around, 
without changing the ultimate political outcome. Holmes was 
emphatically what we would today call a “living constitutionalist,” 
although without the Whig optimism and progressive self-
conception that tends to characterize the living constitutionalists. 
The whole tenor and spirit of Holmes’s approach is elitist, 
pessimistic and Stephen-esque; the deep picture is that mass 
democratization is sending everything to hell, and that the 
politically realistic and economically-minded judge has no choice 
but to help his fellow-citizens get there at the lowest possible 
cost.36 
For present purposes I need not defend Holmes’s account of 
constitutional adjudication on the merits. The major objections to 
the account are tolerably obvious. One is that it might be 
worthwhile to delay a bad future even if we cannot, in the end, 
prevent it from coming into existence. Discounting applies to 
future costs as well as future benefits; a pain tomorrow is not as 
bad as a pain today. If some “rough beast, its hour come round at 
last, slouches towards Bethlehem to be born,”37 then it might be a 
terrible mistake to shorten and lessen the birthpangs. 
 36. As indeed Holmes famously said: “I always say, as you know, that if my fellow 
citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It’s my job.” Letter from Oliver Wendell 
Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Mar. 4, 1920) in 1 HOLMES–LASKI LETTERS: THE 
CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI, 1916-1925, at 249 
(Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,1953). 
 37. W.B. YEATS, The Second Coming, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 
187 (Richard J. Finneran, ed. 1983) (1919).  
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Another objection is that the least-cost principle is 
excessively static. It assumes that the preferences and beliefs of 
the dominant coalition are strictly exogenous to law; thus Holmes 
assumes in Gitlow that socialism either is, or is not, “destined” to 
arrive. But there is a dynamic possibility that the political 
constraints may be partly endogenous, at least in the long run. 
Constitutional adjudication might itself help to shape the 
preferences and beliefs of political actors, at least in part. To the 
extent that the causal arrow sometimes runs from constitutional 
law to political preferences and beliefs, not just the other way 
round, then the least-cost principle might actually be politically 
naïve, despite its hard-headed appeal. Put conversely, the 
Holmesian approach must assume that the judge is capable only 
of imposing the costs of friction, and is incapable of actually 
changing the inevitable course of events. 
Finally, the Holmesian judge labors under the severe 
informational burden of discerning where, exactly, the “actual 
equilibrium of force in the community lies,” or even worse where 
it may lie tomorrow. In addition to the usual legal sources, the 
Holmesian judge takes on the incremental burden of 
understanding the history, current state and future direction of 
constitutional politics. Yet Beardian scholarship may be able to 
help; I will return to these crucial issues shortly. 
What matters for present purposes is just that Holmes offers 
a distinctly nonideal account of constitutional adjudication, one 
that takes into account both current political constraints and 
impending changes in the distribution of political power, and that 
shapes legal rules accordingly. Because it is nonideal, Holmes’s 
account connects up “ought” and “can” in a certain way; ought 
implies can, which means that cannot implies ought not. If a 
certain decision is infeasible, there is no obligation to undertake 
it. This connects the external and internal perspectives on the 
constitutional enterprise; external analysis may help to identify 
the political constraints and forces that must be taken into account 
by the nonideal statesmanship of judges and other actors internal 
to the system. That feature creates space for Beardian 
scholarship. 
B. THE BEARDIAN CONTRIBUTION 
Holmes thought rather poorly of Beard’s book. To Beard 
himself, he said something that was truthful, polite, but reserved: 
that the book “was intended to throw light on the nature of the 
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Constitution, and, in [Holmes’s] opinion, did so in fact.”38 In 
correspondence with Sir Frederick Pollock and Harold Laski, 
however, Holmes called the book “a covert sneer” at the framers’ 
motives and “rather ignoble.”39 Characteristically, Holmes seems 
to have felt the book, even if true, to be a bit churlish, even 
ungentlemanly. 
Yet I believe that Holmes here misunderstood the 
implications of his own view; he ought to have been more 
Beardian than he was. In the Holmesian framework, the function 
of Beardian scholarship is to help judges identify the preferences 
and beliefs of the constitutionally dominant coalition. The 
Beardian scholar serves as an expert witness about constitutional 
politics. The Beardian need not violate the professional 
historian’s reluctance, or the political scientist’s reluctance, to 
draw normative conclusions from their explanatory work. Rather 
the Holmesian judge takes the explanatory input as evidence of 
the shape of the political constraints and, by the alchemy of the 
least-cost principle, transforms it into an indirect, nonideal 
normative conclusion. 
There is a slippage here, between history and current political 
science. The slippage is that the Holmesian judge is not interested 
in history for its own sake, but in history as evidence of current or 
near-future political equilibria. History might supply evidence 
about what the dominant political coalitions once were, and might 
even identify repeated patterns of regime-change or transition, as 
in the historically-inflected work on the typology of presidential 
regimes and the dynamics of transition between presidential 
regimes.40 Yet depending on the issue, the Holmesian judge might 
well prefer current evidence about dominant political coalitions, 
supplied by political scientists, journalists and watchers of politics, 
or even opinion polls.41 Even when Holmes was writing, Beard’s 
own work offered the Holmesian judge a rapidly depreciating 
asset, because the founding era was politically ever more remote 
 38. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS: TURNER, 
BEARD, PARRINGTON 212 (1968). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Steven Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A 
Developmental Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2070 (2008-2009). 
 41. The potential relevance of opinion polls to the Holmesian judge is amusingly 
satirized in Lon L. Fuller, Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949); 
the Holmesian figure is Judge Handy, who bases his decision on shaky evidence of public 
opinion because he believes that men “are ruled well when their rulers understand the 
feelings and conceptions of the masses.” 638. Cf. Holmes’s “first requirement of a sound 
body of law . . . that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the 
community, whether right or wrong.” HOLMES, supra note 28, at 41.  
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and the relevant coalitions largely a thing of the past. That is true 
a fortiori today. (So perhaps Holmes was right after all about 
Beard’s book, insofar as it held little use for him—although that 
was not the ground on which he disparaged it). 
Yet I do not at all think that the near-irrelevance of Beard’s 
own book to the Holmesian judge makes Beardian scholarship 
irrelevant to the Holmesian judge. We have to distinguish Beard 
from the Beardian tradition and style of scholarship, just as we 
have to distinguish Madison from the Madisonian tradition and 
style of constitutional theory. The significance of Beard’s book is 
not direct, as evidence for current judges about the shape and 
force of current political constraints; the founding era is too 
remote for that. Rather the significance of the book is indirect, 
which does not mean unimportant. What Beard did was to shatter 
a spell or break a taboo. Before Beard external history of the 
constitution was overwhelmingly celebratory. After Beard, 
although historians went back and forth over the generations 
about the substantive merits of Beard’s thesis, it was always 
professionally permissible to offer an external explanation of the 
behavior of constitutional actors as a product of their preferences, 
beliefs and political opportunities. Beard’s book initiated a 
broader tradition, spirit and outlook of economic and political 
realism about constitutional rulemaking. 
Beardian scholarship will thus contribute external analysis 
and explanation that will, on the Holmesian approach, be directly 
relevant to the internal but nonideal standpoint of the 
constitutional judge. Under the maxim “ought implies can,” the 
Holmesian approach ties the normative theory of constitutional 
adjudication to political constraints and incentives. Beardian 
scholarship helps judges to identify those constraints and 
incentives. 
To give only one recently topical example, work at the 
intersection of law, history and political science suggests that 
there is a “New Deal settlement”42 that places certain 
constitutional possibilities out of bounds for judges. In the 
abstract, judges with libertarian and decentralizing sympathies 
might be persuaded that the constitutional sources prohibit 
federal laws against interstate shipment of goods produced with 
 42. Lawrence B. Solum & Larry Alexander, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 1594, 1599 (2005) (reviewing Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular 
Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, 219–26 (2004)); see also Cass R. Sunstein, 
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987).  
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child labor; we know they might be so persuaded because once 
upon a time, they were.43 The constitutional text is simply 
indeterminate on this score. Yet we can be utterly confident, in 
light of the New Deal settlement, that today’s libertarian and 
decentralizing judges could not get away with a ruling like that, 
even if they wanted to do so. Holmes’s least-cost principle adds 
that respecting the boundaries of the New Deal settlement is good 
statesmanship and hence good constitutional judging, because 
doing so corresponds to the actual equilibrium of political force in 
the community. 
Again, nothing here is intended as a defense of the joint 
Beardian-cum-Holmesian approach on the merits, as opposed to 
other approaches to constitutional adjudication. The role of 
Beardian scholarship as a sort of expert evidence on the shape and 
force of political constraints sharply poses the questions about 
judicial competence and information costs that I briefly adverted 
to earlier. Scholarship about constitutional politics being what it 
is, there may well be dueling Beardian experts who differ because 
of intractable, reasonable, good-faith disagreement about what 
the evidence shows. Even worse, scholarship about constitutional 
politics being what it is, there may well be a duel between one true 
expert and one false “expert,” bought and paid for by a political 
coalition on one side of the issue; then the court is put to the test 
of sorting the false from the true. Finally, the marginal difficulty 
of adding evidence about public opinion and political constraints 
to the ordinary sources of constitutional decisionmaking may be 
very great. The nature of the relevant evidence is diffuse and 
varied, and legal training does not help the judge to evaluate the 
currents of public opinion. Holmes never did tell us how, exactly, 
to ensure that law “correspond[s] with the actual feelings and 
demands of the community, whether right or wrong.”44 
Of course judges who purport to ignore public opinion may 
well actually be taking it into account sub rosa, in high-salience 
cases especially. The New Deal settlement, although fraying at the 
edges, retains power in its core; it is hard to explain Chief Justice 
Roberts’ famous flinch—casting the decisive vote to uphold the 
crucial provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act45—except on the hypothesis that the Chief Justice was 
worried about a severe backlash and consequent retaliation, from 
 43. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
 44. HOLMES, supra note 28, at 41. 
 45. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).  
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the President, the Democratic Party, and sectors of the public, 
that would seriously damage the Court.46 In other words the Chief 
Justice acted as a Holmesian judge-statesman, bowing to political 
constraints and the unwritten constitutional norms of the New 
Deal regime.47 To the extent judges behave like that, there is a 
standard sort of candor argument for the Holmesian approach; it 
will happen anyway, so it is better to bring it all out into the open. 
Whatever conclusion one reaches about all this, the main 
point is methodological. The joint Beardian-cum-Holmesian 
approach shows that the gulf between external and internal 
perspectives on constitutionalism is not unbridgeable. The two 
may in principle be connected up by a nonideal approach to 
judging that takes political constraints into account, as in the least-
cost principle. A century ago, Beard set us a puzzle to which 
Holmes offered us one possible answer. 
 
 46. Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, CBS NEWS, 
(July 2, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57464549/roberts-switched-views-
to-uphold-health-care-law/. But cf. Lawrence Solum, The Decision to Uphold the Mandate 
as Tax Represents a Gestalt Shift in Constitutional Law, 3 J.L. 173 (2013). An interesting 
contrast here are the Watergate-era cases in which the Court felt able to confront a 
(temporarily) weakened presidency. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
In such cases latent political constraints on the Court, arising from the implicit threat of 
presidential retaliation, were temporarily relaxed. Thanks to Heidi Kitrosser for this point. 
 47. Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Conventions, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 2, 2012), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/book/review/power-precedent-michael-gerhardt.  
 
